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Abstract
In ﬁnite markets with short-selling, conditions on agents’ utilities in-
suring the existence of eﬃcient allocations and equilibria are by now
well understood. In inﬁnite markets, a standard assumption is to
assume that the individually rational utility set is compact. Its draw-
back is that one does not know whether this assumption holds except
for very few examples as strictly risk averse expected utility maximiz-
ers with same priors. The contribution of the paper is to show that
existence holds for the class of strictly concave second order stochas-
tic dominance preserving utilities. In our setting, it coincides with
the class of strictly concave law-invariant utilities. A key tool of the
analysis is the domination result of Lansberger and Meilijson that
states that attention may be restricted to comonotone allocations of
aggregate risk. Eﬃcient allocations are characterized as the solutions
of utility weighted problems with weights expressed in terms of the
asymptotic slopes of the restrictions of agents’ utilities to constants.
The class of utilities which is used is shown to be stable under aggre-
gation.
Keywords: Law invariant utilities, comonotonicity, Pareto eﬃciency, equi 
libria with short selling, aggregation, representative agent.
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The problem of the existence of equilibria in ﬁnite markets with short selling
has ﬁrst been considered in the early seventies by Grandmont [24], Hart [27]
and Green [25] in the context of temporary equilibrium models and assets
equilibrium models. It was later reconsidered by a number of authors (for a
review of the subject in ﬁnite markets, see Allouch et ali [3], Dana et al [17],
Page [35]). Three sets of conditions were given for existence of an equilib 
rium:
  the assumption of existence of a no arbitrage price, a price at which no
investor could make costless unbounded utility nondecreasing purchases (see
for example Grandmont [24], Hammond [26], Page [34], [38]) or equivalently
under standard conditions on utilities, that aggregate demand exists at some
price,
 the no unbounded utility arbitrage condition, a condition of absence of col 
lective arbitrage, which requires that investors do not engage in mutually
compatible, utility nondecreasing trades (see for example, Hart [27], Page
[34], Nielsen [33]),
 and ﬁnally, the assumption that the individually rational utility set is com 
pact (see for example, Dana et al [17], Nielsen [33], Page and Wooders [36]).
Under suitable assumptions, these conditions were shown to be equivalent
(see Dana et al [17] and Page and Wooders [36]).
While the problem of existence of an Arrow Debreu equilibrium in inﬁ 
nite economies with consumption sets bounded below was considered as well
understood at the end of the eighties (see Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw
[1] and Mas Colell and Zame [32]), a number of papers discussed the diﬃcul 
ties raised by the issue of shortselling: Cheng [12], Brown Werner [8], Dana
and Le Van [14],[15], Dana et al [18] and Aliprantis et ali [2], this list not
being exhaustive. The ﬁnite dimension assumptions where shown not to be
equivalent, the assumption of absence of free lunch or of absence of collective
arbitrage too weak. The standard assumption has been to assume that the
individually rational utility set is compact with the drawback that it is not
known whether it is fulﬁlled except for very few examples (models with mean
variance utilities or strictly risk averse expected utilities). For proving exis 
tence of equilibrium in inﬁnite dimension economies with consumption sets
unbounded below, most papers have used the topological version of Negishi’s
approach. Dana Le Van [14],[15] have used utility weights e and the excess
utility correspondence. Their paper however relies on the assumption that





































2More recently, there has been renewed interest for the problem of ex 
istence and characterization of eﬃcient allocations in markets with short 
selling, in the mathematical ﬁnance literature. Indeed, for the last ten years,
the problem of quantifying the risk of a ﬁnancial position has been very
popular in ﬁnance (see F¨ ollmer and Schied [23] for an overview) and has
led to the concept of convex measure of risk. Risk sharing of an aggregate
capital betwen diﬀerent units or diﬀerent investors or of the risk of a bank
between its subsidiaries, led to problems of eﬃciency with shortselling that
have been mainly discussed in inﬁnite dimension (see for example, Barrieu
and El Karoui [6], Filipovic and Svindland [21] and Jouini et ali [28] ). All
of these papers have all considered law invariant convex measures of risk.
To show existence of eﬃcient allocations for law invariant convex mea 
sures of risk, Filipovic and Svindland [21] and Jouini et ali [28] have both
used the domination result of Lansberger and Meilijson [30] that any alloca 
tion of an aggregate risk is dominated for second order stochastic dominance
by a comonotone allocation. Comonotone allocations are allocations having
the property that agents’ wealths are non decreasing functions of aggregate
wealth that add up to identity. They are said to fulﬁll a mutuality principle.
Moreover, the wealths of any pair of agents are positively correlated. Since
the early work of Borch [7], Arrow [4] and Wilson [39], they have played an
important role in the theory of risk sharing between strictly concave expected
utility maximizers, the eﬃcient allocations of risk being comonotone. When
utilities are second order stochastic dominance preserving, from the domina 
tion result, for eﬃciency issues, attention may be restricted to comonotone
allocations. As comonotone allocations are almost compact, with mild conti 
nuity assumptions on utilities, the individually rational utility set is compact.
When the state space is non atomic and the utilities are concave, the hypoth 
esis that utilities are second order stochastic dominance preserving is equiv 
alent to their law invariance. By deﬁnition, law invariant utility functions
only depend on the distributions of wealths and include many standard util 
ities, the expected utility, the rank dependent expected utility, the prospect
utility, Green and Jullien’s utility ( see below), the opposite of a number
of very well known risk measures used in ﬁnance as entropy or averagevar.
They have been very popular in the decision theoretic literature of the eight 
ies. However not all of them are concave. For example risk averse expected
utilities are law invariant and concave while risk taker expected utilities are
law invariant and convex.
The ﬁrst aim of the paper is to show existence of eﬃcient allocations and





































2dominance preserving utilities that fulﬁll some mild continuity properties and
are strictly concave for most of the agents. In view of unifying models used
in economics and in ﬁnance, an l+m agents exchange economy is considered,
the ﬁrst l agents having monetary utilities (adding t units of cash to a position
increases the utility of t ) and the last m agents having law invariant strictly
concave utilities. State contingent claims are assumed to be in L∞, a choice
that may seem odd given current ﬁnancial markets and the horrors of (L∞)′.
As the utilities that are considered in the paper have supergradients in L1
+,
attention may be restricted to countably additive prices (or prices in L1
+ )
and values of contingent claims are integrals with respect to pricing densities.
Since utility functions are concave, the utility weight version of Negishi’s
method may be used to show existence of eﬃcient allocations and equilib 
ria. Eﬃcient allocations are characterized as the solutions of utility weighted
problems for weights expressed in terms of the asymptotic slopes of the re 
strictions to constants of the agents’ utilities. The same utility weights char 
acterize the eﬃcient sharings of a ﬁxed amount of a non random wealth
between l + m agents having as utilities on the reals the restrictions to reals
of agents’ utilities. The eﬃcient utility weights are therefore deﬁned as the
solutions of a set of equalities (monetary agents have same weight, otherwise,
they would exchange cash so as to increase aggregate utility ) and strict in 
equalities expressed in terms of the asymptotic slopes of the restrictions to
constants of the agents’ utilities.
The second aim of the paper is to show that the class of utilities being
studied is stable by aggregation. The aggregation problem is by no mean an
eazy problem. The strictly risk averse RDU class is not stable by aggrega 
tion while the class of Choquet integrals with respect to a convex distortion
is stable. It is shown that the monetary agents have a representative agent
with a monetary law invariant utility (the sup convolution of the monetary
agents’ utilities). Strictly concave agents also have a representative agent
but it depends on the eﬃcient allocation considered ( or on the set of utility
weights characterizing the eﬃcient allocation). At any eﬃcient allocation,
the representative agent of the whole economy has a law invariant strictly
concave utility. Finally at any eﬃcient allocations, the wealths of the strictly
concave agents and the aggregate monetary wealth are comonotone. The
anticomonotonicity of prices and aggregate risk is known to hold in some
cases. The generality of the result remains an open question.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is presented





































2recalled. Using the domination result of Lansberger and Meilijson, the utility
set is shown to be closed and the individually rational utility set is compact.
Section 3 is devoted to the characterization of eﬃcient allocations as solutions
of utility weighted problems. A monetary representative agent independent
of utility weights is introduced. Section 4 is devoted to existence of equilibria
and to some of its qualitative and aggregation properties. An appendix
contains the proof of the two main results of the paper.
2 The domination result for law invariant con-
cave utilities
2.1 The model
We consider a standard Arrow Debreu one good exchange economy under
uncertainty with l + m agents. Agents trade the set of state contingent
claims and have homogeneous beliefs about states of the world. Given as
primitive is a non atomic probability space ( ,B,P), hence it supports a
random variable U uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Contingent claims are
identiﬁed to elements of L∞( ,R) that we now on write L∞. Agents are
described by their endowments Wi ∈ L∞, i = 1,...,l+m and their utilities.
Let W :=
P
i Wi be the aggregate endowment with distribution function FW
assumed to be continuous. Agents’ utilities, ui : L∞ → R are concave, mono 
tone, law invariant (two random variables with same probability law, have
same utility), continuous in the norm topology of   L
∞. We also assume that
the utility of some agent fulﬁlls the following continuity assumption that in 
sures that the superdiﬀerential of the utility is in   L
1(see proposition 2 below).
H Xn ↑ X: a.e. implies u(Xn) ↑ u(X).
A utility is monetary if it is monotone and fulﬁlls
ui(X + t) = ui(X) + t for any t ∈ R,
In other words, if the risk free amount t ∈ R is added to X, then the utility
increases of t. The opposite of a concave monotone, monetary utility is
called a convex measure of risk. Numerous examples of concave, monotone,
law invariant monetary utilities may be found in Jouini et ali [28] and in
F¨ ollmer and Schied [23].
We assume that the utilities of the ﬁrst l agents are concave, monetary,





































2are strictly concave. Let us give an example of such utilities.
An example: Green and Jullien’s utilities
Let X be a random variable and FX(t) = P(X ≤ t), t ∈ R be its distribution
function. The generalized inverse of FX or quantile of X is deﬁned by:
F
−1
X (0) = essinf X and F
−1







X (t))dt, for all X ∈ L
∞ (1)
where L ∈ C2([0,1] × R), ∂xL ≥ 0, ∂xxL < 0 and ∂txL ≤ 0 on [0,1] × R.
The concavity of uL is proven in Carlier and Dana [9]. The strict concavity





X (U) = X}
where U is a uniform law and from the strict concavity of L. Moreover as 




X and from the
dominated convergence theorem, uL(Xn) ↑ uL(X).
In the case L(t,x) = f′(1 − t)U(x) with f convex C1 and U concave C2,
one obtains the rank dependent expected utility.
2.2 A few properties of convave law-invariant utilities
The aim of this section is to show that the utilities that are considered have
two fundamental properties: they are second order stochastic dominance pre 
serving and their superdiﬀerential is in L1.
We recall that X dominates Y for second order stochastic dominance
(SSD), denoted X 2Y if E(U(X)) ≥ E(U(Y )), for every U : R → R con 
cave nondecreasing while X strictly dominates Y for SSD denoted X≻2Y if
E(U(X)) > E(U(Y )) for every strictly concave nondecreasing utility func 
tion U. Hence X∼2Y if and only if X and Y have same distribution. A
map u : L∞ → R (strictly) preserves SSD if X 2 Y ( X≻2 Y ) implies
u(X) ≥ u(Y ) (u(X) > u(Y )). A map u : L∞ → R is law invariant if two
random variables with same distribution have same utility. Since X∼2Y if
and only if X and Y have same distribution, if u preserves SSD, then u is
law invariant. The next proposition provides suﬃcient conditions for the





































2Proposition 1 Let ( ,B,P) be non-atomic and u : L∞ → R be concave,
  ∞ upper semi-continuous. Then
1. u is σ(L∞,L1) upper semi-continuous,
2. u is SSD preserving if and only if u is law invariant and monotone.
Proof. From proposition 4.1 and remark 4.4 in Jouini et ali [29], a   ∞ 
closed convex law invariant subset of L∞ is σ(L∞,L1) closed. Hence if
u : L∞ → R is concave and law invariant,   ∞ upper semi continuous, then
{X ∈ L∞ | u(X) ≥ a} is   ∞ closed convex law invariant, hence is σ(L∞,L1)
closed and u is σ(L∞,L1) upper semi continuous. The second assertion fol 
lows from the ﬁrst assertion and theorem 4.1 in Dana [13].
Let us next recall the deﬁnition of a supergradient of u at X:
∂u(X) = {z ∈ (L
∞)
′ | u(X) − u(X
′) ≥ z   (X − X
′), for all X
′ ∈ L
∞}
The norm continuity of u implies that supergradients exist while H insures
that supergradients are in L1
+.
Proposition 2 For any i, ∂ui(X)  = ∅ and convex. If ui fulﬁlls H , then
∂ui(X) ⊆ L1
+ and is L1 closed.
Proof. Since ui is norm continuous, it follows from Aubin [5], p 108 that
∂ui(X) is non empty, convex and σ((L∞)′,L∞) compact. Since (L∞)′ can be
identiﬁed to the space of bounded ﬁnitely additive measures which vanish on
P null sets, let Q ∈ ∂ui(X). Then Q is ﬁnitely additive and non negative
since ui is monotone. Let us show that Q is σ additive. Let X ∈ L∞ be
given and An ↓ ∅. Then Xn = X − 1An ↑ X. We have
ui(X) − ui(Xn) ≥ z   (X − Xn) = Q(An) ≥ 0
















































2be the set of feasible allocations for aggregate endowment W, We recall
that (Xi)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W) is (strictly) dominated by (X′
i)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W) if ui(X′
i) ≥
ui(Xi) for every i (with a strict inequality for some i), while (Xi)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W)
is  2 (≻2) dominated by (X′
i)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W) if X′
i  2 Xi for every i (strict for
some i). A  2 eﬃcient allocation is a feasible allocation which is not strictly
(not strictly  2) dominated.
Comonotone feasible allocations play a crucial role in risk sharing theory
when utilities are concave monotone, law invariant and norm continuous. We
recall that a pair of random variables (X,Y ) is comonotone if there exists a
subset B ⊂   ×  , P ⊗ P(B) = 1 such that
[X(s) − X(s
′)][Y (s) − Y (s
′)] ≥ 0, ∀(s,s
′) ∈ B
A family of randon variables (Xi)d
i=1 is comonotone if any pair (Xi,Xj)
is comonotone for all (i,j). We next recall a number of useful results on
comonotone allocations.
Proposition 3 1. An allocation (Xi)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W) is comonotone if and
only if there exists l + m non decreasing functions hi on R such that P
i hi =Id, with Xi = hi(W) a.e.
2. Any allocation in A(W) is  2 dominated by a comonotone allocation
in A(W). If the allocation is not comonotone, then there exists an
allocation that strictly dominates it.
3. A feasible allocation (Xi)
l+m
i=1 ∈ A(W) is Pareto optimal iﬀ there exist a











Assertion 1 is well known and proven in Denneberg [20]. If follows that
the hi are 1 Lipschitz. We refer to assertion 2 as the comonotone domi 
nance result. Domination by comonotone allocations was originally proven
by Landsberger and Meilijson [30] for two agents and an aggregate endow 
ment supported by a ﬁnite set. Domination for two agents was extended by
Filipovic and Swidland [21] to an aggregate risk in L1 by a limit argument.
The n agents case is proven in Dana and Meilijson [19] and Ludovski and
R¨ uschendorf [31] also by limits arguments. A direct proof with a construc 





































2proven in Carlier et ali [10] for a non atomic probability space. Assertion
3 with non negative utility weights is well known. Utility weights have to
be positive since if (Xi)
l+m
i=1 is eﬃcient and say λ1 = 0, then agent 1 can
give a strictly positive constant amount to any agent with strictly positive


















Proposition 4 1. For any W ∈ L∞, U(W) is closed and convex,
2. For any W ∈ L∞, a ∈ Rl+m, V (a,W) is compact. In other words, any
subset of the utility set which is bounded below is bounded above.
Proof. Convexity is standard. To prove that U(W) is closed, let vn →
v, vn ∈ U(W). From proposition 3, for any i = 1,,...,l + m, there
exists a sequence Xn
i (W) with Xn
i non decreasing 1 Lipschitz such that
vn
i ≤ ui(Xn
i (W)) for all n and i. Since Xn
i is 1 Lipschitz, we have for all





i (W)) ≤ ui(X
n
i (0) +  W ∞) (2)
which implies that the sequence Xn




i (0) = 0, it is bounded above. Since Xn
i is 1 Lipschitz, it is uni 
formly bounded on compact subsets. From Ascoli’s theorem, a subsequence
converges uniformly to Xi non decreasing 1 Lipschitz on the support of W
and  Xn
i (W) − Xi(W) ∞ → 0. As ui is norm continuous, we have for any i
ui(Xi) = lim ui(Xn
i ) ≥ vi. Hence v ∈ U(W) proving that it is closed. The
proof of the second assertion which uses similar arguments is omitted.




i=1 with utilities bounded above or below has a
subsequence converging to a comonotone allocation in the L∞ norm.
Existence of an equilibrium with prices in (L∞)′ follows from proposition 4
and for example from Brown and Werner [8]. If there are no monetary agents,
then existence of an equilibrium with prices in L1 follows from Dana and Le
Van [15]. By using the utility weight approach, eﬃcient allocations can be





































2prices analysed. Furthermore aggregation properties of the utilities consid 
ered may be discussed. This is therefore the route we follow.
We shall make extensive use of the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If l = 0 or l = 1 then any eﬃcient allocation must be comono-
tone. Furthermore if Pλ(W) has a solution, it is unique.
Proof. From proposition 1, agents’ utilities are SSD preserving. Let (Xi)
l+m
i=1
be eﬃcient and assume that the ﬁrst agent has a concave utility while the
others have strictly concave utilities. From assertion 2 of proposition 3, if
(Xi)
l+m
i=1 is not comonotone, it is strictly dominated for SSD by a feasible
comonotone allocation (Yi)
l+m
i=1 . As we must have for some i > 2, Xi  = Yi
eﬃciency of (Xi)
l+m
i=1 is contradicted. Hence a Pareto optimal allocation is











Remark. We let the reader verify that if all utilities except at most one, are
strictly risk averse, then corollary 1 also holds true.
3 Eﬃcient risk-sharing
This section contains one of the main result of the paper. As standard in
Negishi’s method, eﬃcient allocations are characterized as the solutions of
weighted utilities problems. However, the utility weights for which there are
solutions is not known. Theorem 1 shows that the utility weights for which
the weighted utility problems have solutions are those for which the sharing
of one good beween agents having as utilities the restrictions of the original
utilities to the reals has a solution.
Consider the problem Pλ(x) of optimal sharing of the amount x ∈ R







xi = x, xi, x ∈ R (3)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that ui(xi) xi ∈ R is C1 for all i.
Let u′
j(∞) = limx→∞ u′
j(x), u′
j(−∞) = limx→−∞u′
j(x) be its positive and
negative asymptotic slopes. For 1 ≤ i ≤ l, as ui(x) = x + b for all







































23.1 The main result
Theorem 1 The following are equivalent :
1. Pλ(W) has a solution for any W ∈ L∞,
2. Pλ(x) has a solution for any x ∈ R,
3. λ ≫ 0 and
for all (i,j), i  = j, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, 1 ≤ j ≤ l, λi = λj (4)









∀(i,j), 1 ≤ i ≤ l, l + 1 ≤ j ≤ l + m, λju
′
j(∞) < λi < λju
′
j(−∞) (6)
The proof of theorem 1 may be found in the appendix. Let u0 be the sup 
convolution of the monetary utilities ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ l deﬁned by
u0(X0) = sup{u1(X1) + u2(X2)... + ul(Xl), X1 + ... + Xl = X0} (7)
Let
λ0 = λi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l and e λ = (λ0,λl+1,...,λl+m) (8)
Under (4), (5), (6), it follows from the proof of theorem 1 that solving prob 
lem Pλ(W) is equivalent to solving an m + 1 agents risk sharing problem of
W, e Pe λ(W) where the last m agents have utilities ui and the agent with index
0 has utility u0











and solving u0 at the solution e X0(e λ,W) of e Pe λ(W). Equivalently, the l ﬁrst
agents aggregate into a monetary agent with utility u0 independent of the ef 
ﬁcient allocation and that we are brought down to solve risk sharing problems
between the representative monetary agent and the last m agents.
3.2 Properties of the value function and of the eﬃcient
risk sharing rule
In the remainder of this section, we focus on the value and the solutions of




D = {e λ ∈ R
m+1










j(∞) < λ0 < λju
′





































2For any e λ ∈ D, W ∈ L∞, from theorem 1 and corollary 1, e Pe λ(W) has
a unique solution which is comonotone. Let h(e λ,W), ( e Xi(e λ,W))i∈H and
(e vi(e λ,W))i∈H = (ui( e Xi(e λ,W)))i∈H denote respectively the value function of
e Pe λ(W), its solution and the optimal utilities.
Proposition 5 1. For any e λ ∈ D, h(e λ, ) is concave, monotone, law
invariant, continuous in the norm topology of L∞.
2. For any W ∈ L∞, h( ,W) is convex and continuous on D.
Proof. In assertion one, the concavity and monotonicity of h(e λ, ) are ob 
vious. Since ∞ > h(e λ,W) ≥
Pl+m
i=l+1λIui(0) + λ0u0(W) > −∞ for any
W ∈ L∞ and e λ ∈ D, the domain of h(e λ, ) is L∞ and h(e λ, ) is norm 
continuous on its domain. To prove the law invariance of h(e λ, ), we have
h(e λ,W) = sup
P
i∈H λiui( e Xi(W)) over comonotone allocations of W. If W ′
has same distribution as W, then ui( e Xi(W)) = ui( e Xi(W ′)) since the utilities
ui are law invariant, hence h(e λ, ) is law invariant. To prove assertion 2, the
function h( ,W) is convex as supremum of linear functions. As D ⊆ dom
h( ,W) and is open, h( ,W) is continuous on D.
Let
∂2h(e λ,W) = {z ∈ (L
∞)
′ | h(λ,W) − h(λ,W




be the superdiﬀerential of the value function of problem e Pe λ(W).
Lemma 1 1. For any e λ ∈ D and W ∈ L∞, ∂2h(e λ,W)  = ∅ and convex.
2. For any e λ ∈ D and any W ∈ L∞
∂2e h(e λ,W) = ∩jλj∂2uj( e Xj(e λ,W)) (10)
∂2u0( e X0(e λ,W)) = ∩
l
i=1∂2ui(Xi(e λ,W)) (11)
for any allocation (Xi(e λ,W))l
i=1 solving (7) at X0(e λ,W).
3. If some agent fulﬁlls H, then ∂2h(e λ,W) ⊆ L1
+ and is L1 closed and
convex.
Proof. As h(e λ, ) is norm continuous for any e λ ∈ D, ∂2e h(e λ,W) is non
empty and convex. The second assertion is standard. Assertion 3 follows





































2Proposition 6 1. If e λn ∈ D → e λ ∈ D, then e Xi(e λn,W) → e Xi(e λ,W) in
the norm topology of L∞.
2. If e λn ∈ D → e λ ∈ ∂D, then, for some i, e Xi(e λn,W) → −∞ a.e. and
e vi(e λ,W) → −∞
Proof. To prove the ﬁrst assertion, as shown in the proof of 3 implies 1 in
theorem 1, if a subsequence of e Xi(e λn,0) is unbounded, then
P
i∈H λiui( e Xi(e λn,W))
is dominated for n large enough, hence
P
i∈H λn
i ui( e Xi(e λn,X)) is dominated
for n large enough contradicting the optimality of e Xi(e λn,W). Therefore
e Xi(e λn,0) is bounded. As e Xi(e λn,.) is 1 Lipschitz, e Xi(e λn,.) is uniformly
bounded on compact sets and e Xi(e λn,W) has a subsequence converging to
e X∗
i in the norm topology of L∞. We have for each n, for any comonotone











i ui( e Xi(W))









As e Pe λ(W) has a unique solution ( e Xi(e λ,W))i∈H, e X∗
i (W) = e Xi(e λ,W) for all
i ∈ H. As e Xi(e λn,W) has a unique limit point in the norm topology, it con 
verges to e Xi(e λ,W).
To prove the second assertion, let e λn → e λ ∈ ∂D. Suppose that ui( e Xi(e λn,W))
is bounded below for all i. From proposition 4, it is bounded above and
Xi(e λn,.) is uniformly bounded on compact sets. From Ascoli’s theorem,
e Xi(e λn,W) has a subsequence converging in the norm topology. As in the
previous proof, we obtain that the limit is the solution of e Pe λ(W). From
theorem 1, e λ ∈ D contradicting the assumption that e λ ∈ ∂D. Hence for
some i, e vi(e λn,W) → −∞. Since for every n, e Xi(e λn, ) is 1 Lipschitz, we have
e Xi(e λ
n,0) −  W ∞ ≤ e Xi(e λ
n,W) ≤ e Xi(e λ
n,0) +  W ∞ (12)
As ui is increasing, we obtain
ui( e Xi(e λ
n,0) −  W ∞) ≤ e vi(e λ
n,W) ≤ ui( e Xi(e λ
n,0) −  W ∞)







































From now on, we assume that H is fulﬁlled.
Let us ﬁrst consider the original l + m agents economy. A feasible allo 
cation and a price ((X∗
i )
l+m
i=1 ,z∗) ∈ A(W) × L1
+ is an equilibrium if for any




∗Wi), Xi ∈ L
∞
4.1 The ﬁctitious m + 1 agents’ economy
We have created a ﬁctitious m + 1 agents economy. To deﬁne a concept
of equilibrium for that economy, we assume that agent 0 is endowed with
W0 =
Pl
i=1 Wi. An allocation and a price (( e X∗












∗Wi), Xi ∈ L
∞
4.2 The excess utility correspondence
For e λ ∈ D, the excess utility correspondence e E : D → Rm+1 is deﬁned by
Ei(e λ,W) =
(
z   ( e Xi(e λ,W) − Wi)
λi
, z ∈ ∂2h(e λ,W)
)
, for all i (13)
Restricting attention to agent i, from (10), we have that for all i
e vi(e λ,W) − ui(Wi) ≥
z   (Xi(e λ,W) − Wi)
λi
, z ∈ ∂2h(e λ,W) (14)
We next show that e E has the properties of a ﬁnite dimensional excess demand
correspondence.
Proposition 7 1. For any W ∈ L∞, e λ ∈ D, e E(.,W) is a convex, com-
pact, non empty valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence, which
satisﬁes Walras-law e λ   e E(e λ,W) = 0.
2. If e λn ∈ D → e λ ∈ ∂D, then for some i, e Ei(e λn,W) → −∞.
Proof. The proof of assertion 1 is similar to that of proposition 3.5 in Dana
and Le Van [15]. To prove the second assertion, let e λn ∈ D → e λ ∈ ∂D. We
then have for any tn
i ∈ e Ei(e λn,W)
e vi(e λ







































2From proposition 6, for some j, e vj(e λn,W) → −∞, hence tn
j → −∞ as was
to be proven.
4.3 Existence of equilibrium
For sake of completeness, a generalization of the Gale Nikkaido’s lemma
proven by Florenzano and Le Van [22] is ﬁrst recalled. Given a subset
C ⊆ Rm, C0 = {p ∈ Rm | p   X ≤ 0, for all X ∈ C} is the polar of
C.
Lemma 2 Let C be a closed convex cone in Rm which is not a half-space.
Let S denote the unit sphere of Rm. Let Z be an upper-semi-continuous, non
empty convex compact valued correspondence from C ∩ S into Rm such that
for all λ ∈ C ∩ S, ∃ z ∈ Z(λ), z   λ ≤ 0.
Then there exists λ ∈ C ∩ S such that Z(λ) ∩ C◦  = ∅.
Theorem 2 There exists an equilibrium where agents’ wealths are comono-
tone. At any equilibrium, the wealths of the agents with strictly concave
utilities and the aggregate monetary wealth are comonotone. At each equilib-
rium, the monetary agents have a representative agent with a monetary law
invariant utility independent of the equilibrium. The whole economy has a
representative agent with a law invariant, concave, norm continuous utility.
The proof includes two steps. The equilibria of the ﬁctituous m+1 economy
in which the monetary agent with utility u0 is endowed with the aggregate
monetary endowment and the strictly concave agents are endowed with their
initial endowments is ﬁrst constructed. The proof requires the generalization
of the Gale Nikkaido’s lemma quoted above unless the asymptotic slopes ver 
ify u′
i(∞) = 0, u′
i(−∞) = ∞ for all i, case in which D is the interior of the
positive orthant of Rm+1 and the classical version may be used. This step
determines the strictly concave agents’ equilibrium wealths and the aggre 
gate monetary equilibrium wealth and the equilibrium pricing density. We
then select equilibrium monetary wealths for the ﬁrst l agents from the eﬃ 
cient sharings of the monetary equilibrium wealth. This second step which
is equivalent to determining the equilibria of a monetary economy does not
require the use of a ﬁxed point theorem.
At equilibrium, the representative monetary utility is u0. It is indepen 





































2where λ is an equilibrium weight. It depends on the equilibrium. From propo 
sition 5, it is law invariant, concave, norm continuous and fulﬁlls U. While
it follows from theorem 1 that the set of utility weights for which problems
characterizing eﬃciency have solutions is the same as if agents were expected
utility maximizers with utility indices ui(x), x ∈ R, i = 1,...,l+m, we want
to emphasize that the computation of eﬃcient allocations (and of equilibrium
prices) is a hard problem which has only been adressed for speciﬁc utilities
in a number of papers for monetary utilities (for example [28], [21]), by Car 
lier and Dana [9] for the case of two agents and Carlier and Lachapelle [11]
for n agents for consumption models and strictly concave utilities. An open
question is under which conditions on utilities, prices are anti comonotone
to aggregate risk as in a standard strictly concave expected utility model.
From Carlier and Dana [9], this holds true if for example some agent has
a utility of the type Green and Jullien, but we believe that they are more
general utilities.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of theorem 1
Proof. 1 implies 2, since, from assertion 2 of proposition 3, to show exis 
tence of a solution, we may restrict attention to comonotone allocations. As
a comonotone allocation of a constant is a vector of Rl+m, we are brought
down to consider problem Pλ(x).
Let us next show that 2 implies 3. If problem Pλ(x) has a solution (x∗
i)m
i=1,




i) for any pair of
agents. This implies that for any pair (i,j) of monetary agents, λi = λj, for






i(+∞) and any pair (i,j) of risk
neutral risk averse agents λju′
j(+∞) < λi < λju′
j(−∞).
To prove that 3 implies 1, let X0 =
Pl
i=1 Xi. As λi = λj, let
u0(X0) = sup{u1(X1) + u2(X2)... + ul(Xl), X1 + ... + Xl = X0}
be the sup convolution of the law invariant monetary utilities ui,i = 1,...,l.
From Filipovic and Swidland [21], u0 is concave ﬁnite valued, exact, law
invariant,   ∞ continuous. When the weights fulﬁll (4) , (5), (6) solving
problem Pλ(W) may be brought down to solving an m+1 agents risk sharing





































2agent with index 0 has a monetary utility u0:










with λ0 = λi, 1 ≤ i ≤ l and solving the sup convolution at the solution
X0(λ,W) of Pλ(W). To show existence of a solution to e Pλ(W), from assertion
2 of proposition 3, we may restrict attention to comonotone allocations of
W and from corollary 1, the solution if it exists is unique. Let H = {0,l +
1,...,l+m} and ( e Xi(W))i∈H be an m+1 comonotone allocations of W. We
have for all i ∈ H:
e Xi(0) −  W ∞ ≤ e Xi(W) ≤ Xi(0) +  W ∞ (15)
Let us ﬁrst show that e Pλ(W) has a ﬁnite value. From assertion (5) and (6),










Let Yi = e Xi(0)+ W ∞ and I = {i ∈ H | Yi ≤ 0} and J = {i ∈ H | Yi > 0}.
W.l.o.g. assume that 0 ∈ I. Note that from 15, Yi ≥ e Xi(W) for all i ∈ H.
From (16), we ﬁrst have for i ∈ I,



















Summing over i,j, we thus have since
P




























Taking the supremum over partitions I,J of H on the left hand side and the










































2Let us now show existence of an optimal solution for e Pλ(W). Let ( e Xn
i (W))i∈H
be a maximizing sequence of e Pe λ(W). If this sequence is such that for all
i ∈ H, e Xn
i (0) is bounded, from (15), ( e Xn
i ) is uniformly bounded on compact
sets. From Ascoli’s theorem, for every i, ( e Xn
i ) has a subsequence converging
to ( e Xi) uniformly. Hence e Xn
i (W) → e Xi(W) for the L∞ norm and ( e Xi(W))
solves e Pe λ(W).
Suppose now that there exists a subsequence such that for some i, e Xn
i (0) →
−∞. Let I,J,K be such that e Xn
i (0) → −∞, i ∈ I, e Xn
i (0) → +∞, j ∈
J, e Xn




0, J  = ∅. We further assume that K  = ∅ and that 0 ∈ K (if not the proof
that follows has to be slightly modiﬁed ). Note that, as
P
i e Xn
i (0) = 0 and
P
i∈K e Xn
i (0) is bounded,
P
I∪J e Xn
i (0) is bounded. From (4) and (5), there
exists ε > 0, B > 0 and A > 0, such that
λiu
′




j(A)) + ε, for all i ∈ I (17)
Let us show that for n large enough, the sequence e Xn
i (W) is dominated.
Let card(A) denote the cardinal of the set A. Let Y n





Bcard(I) − Acard(J), Y n
i (W) = −B if i ∈ I, Y n
i (W) = A, i ∈ J, Y n
i (W) =
e Xn
i (W) otherwise. The allocation (Y n
i (W))i∈H is feasible. From (15), we
have with m0 = − W ∞card(I ∪ J) + Bcard(I) − Acard(J),
λ0(u0(Y
n







i (0) + m0) =: M0 (18)
For i ∈ I, we have from (15) and (17), with M = −B −  W ∞
λi(ui(−B) − ui( e Xn
i (W))) ≥ λi(ui(−B) − ui( e Xn
i (0) +  W ∞) >
λiu′
i(−B)(M − e Xn
i (0)) > (maxi∈J λju′
j(A) + ε)(M − e Xn
i (0))
(19)
for n large enough since e Xn
i (0) → −∞ and M − e Xn
i (0) > 0.
For j ∈ J, we have from (15), with M′ = A −  W ∞,
λj(uj(A) − uj( e Xn
j (W))) ≥ λj(uj(A) − uj( e Xn
j (0) +  W ∞))
λju′
j(A)(M′ − e Xn
j (0)) ≥ (maxj∈J λju′
j(A))(M′ − e Xn
j (0))
(20)
for n large enough since e Xn
j (0) → ∞ and (M′ − Xn
j (0)) < 0. Summing over





i (W)) − ui( e X
n













































2As for n large enough, the right hand side is arbitrarely large, this contradicts
the deﬁnition of ( e Xn
i (W)). Hence ( e Xn
i (0)) must be bounded, a case already
studied and assertion 1 is fulﬁlled.




e λ ∈ R
m+1










Then Kn is a closed convex cone and Kn ⊆ D. From proposition 7 and
lemma 2 applied on Kn to the upper hemicontinuous and compact valued
correspondence −e E which veriﬁes Walras law, for any n, there exists e λn ∈ Kn
and en ∈ e E(e λn) such that −e λn  en ≤ 0 for all e λ ∈ Kn. Let λ be a limit point
of e λn. There are two cases:
Case 1) λ ∈ D. Then by proposition 7, en → e ∈ e E(λ). Since −e λ en ≤ 0 for
all e λ ∈ Kn, we have −e λ e ≤ 0 for all e λ ∈ D. Since D is open, we must have
−λ   e < 0 if e  = 0 which contradicts Walras Law. Hence e = 0. This means
that there exists z ∈ ∂2e h(λ,W) such that 0 = E(z(Xi(λ,W)−Wi)) for i = 0
or i ≥ l + 1. Furthermore, since z ∈ λi∂2ui(Xi(λ,W)), for all Xi ∈ L∞, we
have
λi(ui(Xi(λ,W)) − ui(Xi))) ≥ E(z(Xi(λ,W) − Xi)) = E(z(Wi − Xi))
thus E(zXi) ≤ E(zWi) implies ui(Xi) ≤ ui(Xi(λ,W)) for i = 0 or i ≥ l + 1.
Hence ((Xi(λ,W)),z) is an equilibrium for the ﬁctituous m+1 agents econ 
omy.
Case 2) λ ∈ ∂D and  en  → ∞. Since (en)i + ui(Wi) ≤ vi(e λn,W) for all i
((en)i + ui(Wi)) ∈ e U(W) for all n where e U(W) the utility set of the m + 1











 en ) → t ∈ e U∞(W) − {0} the asymptotic cone of e U(W). Therefore
e λ   t ≤ 0 for any e λ ∈ D. Furthermore, since −e λ   en ≤ 0, for all e λ ∈ Kn, we





































2e λ ∈ D which is impossible since D is open. Hence only case 1 is possible.
Let us now construct an equilibrium for the l + m agents economy.
Let λi = λ0, i = 1,...,l. As an equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient, from
theorem 1, (Xi(λ,W))l
i=1 must be an optimal solution of (7) at X0(λ,W)
that fulﬁlls E(z Xi) = E(zWi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Indeed from lemma 1,
z ∈ λi∂ui(Xi(λ,W)) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l, hence Xi(λ,W) solves
maxui(Xi) s.t. E(zXi) ≤ E(zWi), Xi ∈ L
∞
Let us show that from the monetary assumption, the equilibrium allocation
may be constructed without using a ﬁxed point theorem. Let 1 ∈ Rl be such
that (1)i = 1 for all i = 1,...,l. Since z ∈ λ0∂u0(X0(λ,W)) and u0 is cash
invariant, we have
λ0u0(X0(λ,W)) − λ0u0(X0(λ,W) + 1) = −λ0 ≥ −E(z)
λ0u0(X0(λ,W)) − λ0u0(X0(λ,W) − 1) = λ0 ≥ E(z)
hence E(z) = λ0.
Let ((Xi(λ,W)) be any solution of (7) at X0(λ,W). We claim that the
allocation (Xi(λ,W) + E( z



















the ﬁrst equality holds true since ui is monetary, the second since X0(λ,W) = Pl
i=1Xi(λ,W) and E(zX0(λ,W)) = E(z
Pl
i=1 Wi) (z being an equilibrium




(Wi − Xi(λ,W))) = E(zWi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l
Finally we claim that (Xi(λ,W))
l+m
i=1 ,z) is an equilibrium of the l+m agents




i Wi) and for all i, we






































[1] Aliprantis C.D., Brown D.J. , Burkinshaw O., Existence and Optimal 
ity of Competitive Equilibria Springer Verlag.
[2] Aliprantis C.D.,Brown, D.J., Polyrakis I.A., Werner J., Portfolio Dom 
inance and Optimality in Inﬁnite Asset Markets, Journal of Mathemat 
ical Economics 30 1998, 347–366.
[3] Allouch N., Le Van C., Page F.H., The geometry of arbitrage and the
existence of competitive equilibrium, Journal of Mathematical Eco 
nomics 38 2002 , 373–391.
[4] K.J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the welfare of medical care, Amer.
Econom. Rev. 53 (1963), 941–973.
[5] Aubin, J.P. , Mathematical Methods of Game and Economic Theory ,
North Holland, 1982 .
[6] Barrieu P., El Karoui N., Inf convolution of risk measures and optimal
risk transfer, Finance and Stochastics 9 2002, 269–298.
[7] K. Borch, Equilibrium in a reinsurance market, Econometrica, 30
(1962), 424–444.
[8] Brown, D.J., Werner J., Arbitrage and Existence of Equilibrium in
Inﬁnite Asset Markets, Review of Economics studies 62 1993, 101–114.
[9] Carlier G. Dana R. A., Two persons eﬃcient risk sharing and equilibria
for concave law invariant utilities, Economic theory 36 2008, 189–223.
[10] Carlier G. Dana R. A., Galichon A., Pareto eﬃciency for the
concave order and multivariate comonotonicity, working paper:
ArXiv:0912.0509v1 [math.OC], 2009
[11] Carlier G., Lachapelle A., A numerical approach for a class of risk 
sharing problems, working paper, Ceremade 2010.
[12] Cheng H., Asset Market Equilibrium in Inﬁnite Dimensional Complete
Markets, Journal of Mathematical Economic 20 1991, 137–152.
[13] Dana R. A., A representation result for concave Schur concave func 
tions, Mathematical Finance 15 2005, 613–634.
[14] Dana R.A., C. Le Van, General Equilibria in Lp spaces. A duality





































2[15] Dana R.A., C. Le Van, Arbitrage, Duality and Asset Equilibria, Journal
of Mathematical Economics 34 2000 397–413.
[16] Dana R.A., C. Le Van, Overlapping sets of priors and the existence
of eﬃcient allocations and equilibria for risk measures, To appear in
Mathematical Finance.
[17] Dana, R.A., Le Van C., Magnien F., On the diﬀerent notions of ar 
bitrage and existence of equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 86
1999, 169–193.
[18] Dana, R.A., Le Van C., F.Magnien, Asset Equilibrium in Assets Mar 
kets with and without Short selling, Journal of Mathematical Analysis
and Applications 206 1997, 567–588 .
[19] Dana, R.A., Meilijson I, Modelling agents’ preferences in complete mar 
kets by second order stochastic dominance, Cahier du Ceremade 0238.
[20] Denneberg D., Non additive Measures and Integral, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Holland, 1994 .
[21] Filipovic D., Swidland G., Optimal capital and risk allocations for law
invariant and cash invariant convex functions, Finance and Stochastics
12 2008, 423–439.
[22] Florenzano M., C. Le Van, A Note on Gale Nikaido Debreu Lemma and
the Existence of General Equilibrium , Economics Letters 22, 107–110.
[23] F¨ ollmer H., Schied A., Stochastic ﬁnance. An introduction in discrete
time, De Gruyter editor, Berlin, 2004 .
[24] Grandmont, J.M., Temporary General Equilibrium Theory, Economet 
rica 45 1977, 535–572.
[25] Green, J., Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading
Model with Spot and Future Transaction, Econometrica 41 1973, 1103 
1123.
[26] Hammond, P.J., Overlapping expectations and Hart’s condition for
equilibrium in securities model, Journal of Economic Theory 31 1983,
170–175.
[27] Hart, O., On the Existence of an Equilibrium in a Securities Model,





































2[28] E. Jouini, W. Schachermayer, N. Touzi, Optimal risk sharing for law
invariant monetary utility functions, Mathematical Finance 18 2008 ,
269–292.
[29] Jouini, E., Schachermayer W., Touzi N., Law invariant risk measures
have the Fatou property, Advances in Mathematical Economics, 9 2006,
pp. 49–71.
[30] Landsberger M., Meilijson I., Comonotone allocations, Bickel Lehmann
dispersion and the Arrow Pratt measure of risk aversion, Annals of
Operations Research 52 1994, 97–106.
[31] Ludkovski M., R¨ uschendorf L., On comonotonicity of Pareto optimal
risk sharing, Statistics and Probability Letters 78 2008 , 1181–1188.
[32] Mas Collel, A. Zame W., Equilibrium theory in inﬁnite dimensional
spaces, Handbook of Mathematical Economics, vol 4, North Holland,
1001.
[33] Nielsen, L.T., Asset market equilibrium with short selling, Review of
Economic Studies 56, 1989, 467–474.
[34] Page, F.H., On equilibrium in Hart’s securities exchange model, Jour 
nal of Economic Theory 41 1987, 392–404.
[35] Page, F.H., Arbitrage and Asset Prices, Mathematical Social Sciences
31 1996, 183–208.
[36] Page, F.H., Wooders M.H., A necessary and suﬃcient condition for
compactness of individually rational and feasible outcomes and exis 
tence of an equilibrium, Economics Letters 52 1996, 153–162.
[37] G. Puccetti, M. Scarsini, Multivariate comonotonicity, Journal of Mul 
tivariate Analysis 101 (2010), 291–304.
[38] Werner, J., Arbitrage and the Existence of Competitive Equilibrium,
Econometrica 55 1987, 1403 1418.
[39] R. Wilson, The theory of syndicates, Econometrica 55 (1968), 95 115.
23
h
a
l
-
0
0
6
5
5
1
7
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
 
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
2